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Abstract:  
 
The role of constitutional courts in deeply divided societies is complicated 
by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial 
decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial impartiality and 
independence. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-national 
affiliation on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial 
tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of 
an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in 
fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of 
cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to 
their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, 
however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence 
of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings 
suggest that this influence may actually increase as a judge acclimates to the 
dynamics of a divided court. We conclude by considering how alternative 
arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate 
this problem. 
 
The challenge of designing institutions to manage ethno-national conflict 
is a long-running topic of academic inquiry and dispute (see Horowitz 
1985; Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2007). Generally speaking, 
the focus is on how legislatures, executives, and electoral systems can be 
organized to accommodate the politics of deeply divided societies 
(Choudhry 2008). The design of courts figures much less frequently in 
this literature (for some exceptions, see Choudhry and Stacey 2012; 
Horowitz 2006; Issacharoff 2015; McCrudden and O’Leary 
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2013). But courts, particularly constitutional courts, may play a vital role 
in such contexts. Although inter-group trust is likely to be fragile in the 
wake of conflict, courts may help to make constitutional commitments to 
group autonomy and the protection of minority rights more credible than 
they might otherwise be (see Lake and Rothchild 1996; North and 
Weingast 1989). Further-more, any constitutional settlement of any 
complexity will inevitably generate disputes about the meaning and 
implication of its terms. Where disagreement cannot be resolved 
politically, a constitutional court offers a potential focal point to 
coordinate a solution and, hopefully, avoid constitutional collapse (see 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009: 107–08; Ginsburg 2012: 725). Both 
of these functions require the court to be, or at least appear to be, 
sufficiently impartial and independent with respect to rival ethno-political 
factions.  
Although judicial impartiality and independence are often conflated 
(see Karlan 1999; Tiede 2006), the two can be usefully distinguished. We 
can define “judicial impartiality” as the extent to which judges are 
unmoved by prejudices or ideological biases that might incline them to 
decide a dispute one way or the other. In contrast, “judicial 
independence” can be defined as the extent to which judges are insulated 
from threats and incentives that might motivate them to decide a dispute 
one way or the other (regardless of the legal merits and their own sincere 
preferences). Each of these qualities is associated with a distinct aspect of 
court design. As Brinks and Blass (2016) explain, the design of courts 
varies with respect to what they call “ex ante autonomy” and “ex post 
autonomy.” The former concerns the scope for political actors to 
influence the political biases of the court through the appointment of 
“ideological allies” (Brinks and Blass 2016: 5) and therefore affects 
judicial impartiality. The latter concerns the extent to which political or 
other external actors can pressure judges to decide a case one way or the 
other and therefore goes to judicial independence.  
Neither the impartiality nor the independence of constitutional courts 
can be taken for granted. Even in relatively homogenous democracies, 
constitutional courts are often seen to be highly politicized in terms of 
their appointment processes, decision-making, and the kinds of cases they 
hear (Amaral-Garcia, Garoupa, and Grembi 2009; Garoupa, Gomez-
Pomar, and Grembi 2013; Honnige 2009). But courts in deeply divided 
polities face special dangers and challenges, particularly in the wake of 
conflict where the rule of law is weak (Haggard and Tiede 2014). 
Minorities may worry that the court will be indefinitely captured by the 
majority and, consequently, have little or no confidence in the court’s 
ability to protect their rights and interests 
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(Sadurski 2014: 304–28). Furthermore, assuming that dissenting opinions 
are made public, conspicuous ethnic or ethno-national divisions within 
the court may undermine its image as a neutral arbiter of constitutional 
dispute (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2011). Thus, to the extent that it might 
affect judicial impartiality and independence, the design of a 
constitutional court in a deeply divided society may be nearly as 
important to the success of a constitutional settlement as the substance of 
the settlement itself. Indeed, the conventional wisdom, in both academic 
and policy circles, is that the design of courts does make a difference. 
Merit-based selection systems are favored over party-political appoint-
ment processes on the grounds that they are more likely to select better 
qualified and more impartial judges (see Ginsburg and Garoupa 2009; 
Reddick 2001; Volcansek 2007). Life or long-term tenure is thought to 
enhance judicial independence by insulating judges from careerist 
pressures and incentives to placate political elites (see Jackson 2007; La 
Porta et al. 2004). These suppositions have recently been subjected to 
some rigorous comparative research (Hayo and Voigt 2007; Melton and 
Ginsburg 2014),1 but the challenge of achieving judicial impartiality and 
independence in ethnically or ethno-nationally divided polities remains 
virtually uncharted research territory.  
With reference to the experience of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, we investigate the relationship between ethno-
national affiliation and judicial behavior and the extent to which variation 
in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that rela-tionship.2 The Bosnian 
Constitutional Court is a particularly interesting case-study for several 
reasons. Firstly, it provides a window into the challenges facing recently 
empowered courts in transitional and post-conflict settings. The study of 
courts in con-texts where the rule of law is relatively tenuous may help 
illuminate the factors that determine how and why some courts become 
“consequential” while others remain marginal or 
 
1 As we discuss below, the results of this research are mixed with respect to how and to what 
extent the design of courts affects judicial behavior.
 
 
2 Our approach assumes, as countless other studies do, that quantitative analysis allows for valid 
causal inference about the factors that affect judicial behavior. However, we recognize that some would 
argue that ethno-national background, in so far as it is an immu-table personal characteristic akin to 
race or sex, cannot be treated as a true causal variable because it cannot be conceptualised as a 
“treatment,” i.e., a property that is, at least hypothetically, amenable to “manipulation” (see Boyd et al. 
2010; Greiner and Rubin 2011). This interpretation of causal inference is not accepted by everyone (see 
Marcellesi 2013; Sen and Wasow 2016). We are agnostic about the right way to conceptualise variables 
of this kind but, for the sake of convenience, the discussion that follows sometimes refers to the 
“influence” or “effect” of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behavior. The reader may elect to 
interpret such statements as propositions about “relationships” between variables (as opposed to true 
“causal effects”). 
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ineffectual (see Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001; Kapiszewski, 
Silverstein, and Kagan 2013). Second, the case of a court in an ethno-
nationally divided society provides an opportunity to see if and how the 
“attitudinal model” of judicial behavior (which has been so influential in 
the study of courts in the United States) can be extended to contexts 
where the more familiar left-right ideological spectrum is usually 
overshadowed by other kinds of politics. Such efforts are vital if we are to 
move beyond well-worn theoretical frameworks that have relied, perhaps 
too heavily, on courts in the United States for their inspiration (see 
Hirschl 2014: ch 5). Finally, the record of the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court is particularly fertile ground for investigating the effects of court 
design. In the absence of “mid-stream” changes to the basic institutional 
makeup of courts, studies that seek to test hypotheses about the effects of 
court design rely on cross-national or cross-jurisdictional comparisons for 
variance (Brace and Hall 1997: 1210). In contrast, the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court allows for a kind of within-country natural 
experiment. Although the Court has always been composed of an equal 
number of politically appointed judges from each of the three main 
communities (two Bosniaks, two Serbs, and two Croats), the first set of 
judges were appointed for 5-year non-renewable mandates while judges 
appointed thereafter enjoy long-term tenure (with mandatory retirement at 
age 70). We aim to leverage this “mid-stream” institutional change to 
estimate the effects of judicial tenure on judicial behavior.  
Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the non-
unanimous abstract review decisions of the Constitutional Court, we find 
that judges on the Constitutional Court do in fact divide predictably along 
ethno-national lines and that these divisions can-not be reduced to a 
residual loyalty to their appointing political par-ties. Contrary to some 
theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does not 
dampen the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behavior. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the 
Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-
making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for 
the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem. 
 
Background on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Constitutional 
Court 
 
 
In 1995, representatives of the belligerent parties to the Bosnian war 
concluded the so-called “Dayton Agreement”, ending a conflict that had 
already claimed about 100,000 lives. Annex 4 to 
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the Dayton Agreement included a new constitution for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, prescribing a complex mix of power-sharing and territorial 
decentralization as a compromise between the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) 
goal of a unitary sovereign state and the Croat and Serb objectives of 
separate/irredentist breakaway republics (Bieber 2006; Keil 2013). 
Pursuant to the Agreement, the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was divided into two sub-state entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), which is mostly Bosniak and partially Croat 
and is itself divided into ten cantons, and the Serb-dominated Republika 
Srpska (hereafter “RS”).3  
Alongside territorial decentralization, the Constitution fragments 
power within the central state-level (hereafter “BiH”) institutions, 
requiring power-sharing between the three “constituent peoples.”4 The 
executive is to be led by a three person presidency with positions 
allocated along ethno-national lines, i.e., one Bos-niak, one Serb, and one 
Croat.5 The Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency are elected by 
voters registered to vote in the FBiH who may vote for either the Bosniak 
or Croat member of the Presidency but not for both, while the Serb 
member of the Presidency is directly elected by voters registered to vote 
in RS. Executive power is parcelled out among a Council of Ministers, 
1/3 of which must be appointed from the territory of RS.6 These power-
sharing mechanisms are complemented by a set of mutual veto powers 
(Bahtic´-Kunrath 2011).7 All of this is overseen by the peculiar 
institution of the Office of the High Representative, effectively an 
extension of the “international community” empowered to supervise and 
support the implementation and maintenance of the Dayton Agreement 
(see Belloni 2008; Caplan 2004).8 
 
To uphold the legal dimensions of these arrangements, the 
Constitution establishes an apex court: the Constitutional Court of 
 
3
 Following an arbitration process to settle a territorial dispute that was not yet resolved at the 
time of the Agreement, a distinct administrative district, Brcˇko, was later formed and initially 
administered by the international community. Although Brcˇko is for-mally part of both sub-state 
entities, it is now administered by its own municipal government and subject to the laws of the central 
state. 
 
4 The phrase “constituent people” is introduced in the Constitution’s preamble and used 
throughout the Constitution to refer to Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
 
5 Art. V.  
6 Art. V, 4(b); Art. 4, 3(e).  
7 Art. 5, 2(d). There are effectively two veto powers: 1. the “vital national interest” veto, which may be 
activated either by a member of the Presidency or a majority of the ethnic caucus in the House of Peoples; and 
2. the so-called “entity veto,” whereby all decisions in both houses require support of at least one-third of the 
delegates elected from each sub-state entity.
 
 
8 Although the Office of the High Representative has played a somewhat less inter-ventionist 
role in Bosnian politics in recent years, the country has yet to meet the conditions required for phasing 
the institution out.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 The Constitutional Court [hereafter “the 
Court”] is a variation on the “Kelsenian” model common through-out 
much of continental Europe (Stone 1990). Consistent with that model, the 
Court has exclusive “abstract review” jurisdiction to hear disputes arising 
under the Constitution “between the Entities or between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.”10 Such disputes may only be referred to the Court by 
“a member of the Presidency, by the Chair of the Council of Ministers, by 
the Chair or a Deputy Chair of either chamber of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, by one-fourth of the members of either chamber of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, or by one-fourth of either chamber of a 
legislature of an Entity”.11 Provided that the petitioner falls within one of 
these categories, the Court has no discretion to refuse to hear an abstract 
review challenge. In addition, the Court has appellate jurisdiction “over 
issues under this Constitution arising out of a judgment of any other court 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”12 Lower courts may also refer a law to the 
Constitutional Court where its decision depends on the law’s validity.13 
Finally, in exceptional cases, the Court has jurisdiction to review the use 
of the so-called “vital national interest” veto where legislative deadlock 
cannot otherwise be resolved.14  
The constitutional provisions governing the appointment of judg-es 
to the Constitutional Court reflect the system of ethno-territorial power-
sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina: four judges are appointed by the 
legislature of the FBiH entity and two by the legislature of the RS 
entity.15 In addition to these “domestic” judges, the Constitution also 
provides for the inclusion of three “international” judges, ostensibly as an 
impartial ballast, to be appointed by the President of the European Court 
of Human Rights in consultation with the Presidency of BiH.16 These 
judges cannot be from Bosnia-Herzegovina or from any of its 
neighboring countries.17 The only limit imposed by the Constitution 
 
 
9 Art. VI. The Court is technically a reconstituted version of the original sub-national 
Constitutional Court of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (a constituent republic of 
what was Yugoslavia).
  
10 Art. VI 3(a).  
11 Ibid.  
12 Art. VI 3(b). In practice, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is much broader than might be 
supposed because the right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, protected under Art. 3(e), may 
be engaged by virtually any legal proceeding where it is alleged that an error was made by a lower 
court.
 
13 Art. VI 3(c).  
14 Art. IV 3(f).  
15 Art. VI 1(a).  
16 Art. VI 1(a).  
17 Art. VI 1(b). 
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on the selection of the domestic judges is the somewhat vague criterion 
that they be “distinguished jurists of high moral standing.”18 Hence, the 
judges come to the Court with varied professional backgrounds and 
experience (see the Appendix).19 Eight of the eighteen domestic judges 
who have sat on the Court were previously judges on lower courts and/or 
entity-level constitutional courts. Five of those eighteen were previously 
legal academics, holding positions at law schools in Sarajevo, Banja 
Luka, or Mostar. Seven held some kind of government job or elected 
political office prior to being appointed to the Constitutional Court. All of 
the domestic judges are either graduates of Bosnian law schools (i.e., 
Banja Luka, Mostar, or Sarajevo) or law schools in the former Yugoslavia 
(i.e., Belgrade or Novi Sad). There are clear ethno-territorial patterns in 
these various backgrounds. Of those judges with prior judicial experience, 
Bosniak and Croat judges served on courts in FBiH (or what is now 
FBiH) while the Serb judges served on courts in RS (or what is now RS). 
Similarly, of those judges with prior political or government experience, 
Bosniaks and Croats occupied such roles within FBiH entity (or what is 
now FBiH), while the Serbs had roles within RS (or what is now RS). 
The judges’ legal education also appears to follow an ethno-territorial 
pattern: most of the Bosniak or Croat judges went to law school in what is 
now FBiH, while all of the Serb judges trained in what is now either the 
RS entity or Serbia. 
 
Although there is no legal requirement that the domestic judges be of 
any particular ethno-national background, the convention is that the four 
judges appointed by the FBiH entity legislature will always include two 
Bosniaks and two Croats and the two judges appointed by the Serb entity 
legislature will be Serbs. By all accounts, the appointment of these judges 
is closely orchestrated by the political parties (Radic´-Dragic´ 2012). 
When a vacancy in one of the domestic posts arises, a commission for 
selection and appoint-ment is constituted within the relevant legislature to 
invite and review applications and compile a list of candidates. This list is 
then presented to the legislature to elect the requisite number of judges by 
secret ballot. At the FBiH entity legislature, the process is subject to a 
kind of elite pact; the dominant Bosniak and Croat parties separately 
determine which of “their” respective judges will be nominated and 
ultimately appointed. At the RS entity legislature, the process is simpler – 
appointments are controlled by the dominant party (which has always 
been a Serb nationalist party).  
Despite the political nature of the appointment process, the Court 
enjoys a good deal of formal “ex post autonomy.” Once appointed, the 
judges may only be removed “for cause by 
 
18 Art. VI 1(b).  
19 Our biographical data on the judges is taken from the Court’s public records. 
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consensus of the other judges.”20 Otherwise, as was mentioned earlier, 
the first set of judges held short-term mandates of 5 years while all judges 
thereafter are appointed for long-term mandates with mandatory 
retirement at age 70.21 Furthermore, the Court has complete control over 
its own internal rules and procedures, which are neither prescribed by the 
Constitution nor defined by legislation,22 and it is also responsible for 
drafting its own budget (to be allocated from a central state fund).23  
In addition to the formal independence enjoyed by the Court, the 
fragmented and decentralized political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(with its several veto points) makes it difficult for domestic political 
actors to coordinate and launch a direct attack against it (Ferejohn 2002; 
Tsebelis 2002). Consequently, the Court is comparatively insulated from 
overt “court curbing.”24 Indeed, contrary to the expectation that 
constitution-al courts in new democracies will be relatively timid and 
underutilized (Ginsburg 2003), the Court was quickly drawn into the 
political fray and asserted itself as a powerful and important player in 
several early landmark cases.25 The best example of this confidence is 
Case U-5/98 (often called “The Decision on the 
 
 
20 Art. VI 1(c). This power has only been used once, in 2010, after leaked correspon-dence 
between Judge Krstan Simic  ´and Serb politicians seemed to show the existence of on-going ties (and 
even active collusion) between Simic  ´and SNSD. The Court acted quickly to oust Simic ,´ justifying his 
removal on the grounds that he had been “deliberately undermin-ing the reputation and dignity of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dignity of a judge” (see the Court’s decision at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/Decision_ on_Dismissal.pdf). It should also be noted that, despite 
questionable constitutional authori-ty, the High Representative once acted to block the appointment of 
two Serb judges (see “Decision annulling the appointment of two Judges from the RS to the BiH 
Constitutional Court”, 16 September 2002). 
 
21 Art. VI 1(c). We have not been able to conclusively determine the original rationale for this 
two-phased tenure system, but it is said to have been a compromise between the preferences of the 
Dayton Agreement’s negotiators. 
22 See Article VI.3(a), which empowers the Court to adopt its own rules.  
23 Art. III, Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of 
BiH no. 22/14). The Court defended its financial independence in Case U 6/06 (29 March 2008). The 
Court invalidated a national law that sought to reduce the salaries of the judiciary, reasoning that the 
Constitution requires that the Court itself control the plan and allocation of its own budget.
 
 
24 It should be noted, however, that the High Representative’s extraordinary powers to legislate 
by decree have been used on one occasion to effectively overrule a decision of the Court (see Everly 
2008). The relationship between the Office of the High Representa-tive and the Court is a fascinating 
topic in its own right but it is also one that is beyond the scope of the discussion here.
 
 
25 In its first few years, the Court was called on to decide controversies of profound 
constitutional significance: the constitutionality of the Dayton Agreement itself (Case U-7/ 97); 
changes to the organization of the Council of Ministers (Case U-1/99); the amenability of the High 
Representative’s decisions to judicial review (Case U-9/00); and, perhaps most controversially of all, 
the compatibility of provisions of the entity constitutions with the con-stitutional principle of the 
“equality of constituent peoples” (Case U-5/98). 
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Constituency of Peoples”), where the Court invalidated sections of both 
entity constitutions. The case arose from an abstract review challenge 
brought by Alija Izetbegovic´, then the Bosniak member of the BiH state-
level Presidency. The main thrust of the challenge concerned several 
provisions of the entity constitutions which, in the case of RS, seemed to 
reflect a mono-national and distinctly Serb-centric conception of the sub-
state entity, or, in the case of the FBiH entity, granted special recognition 
and rights to Bosniaks and Croats but failed to include Serbs on equal 
footing. Although nothing in the substantive body of the Constitution 
explicitly prohibited any of this, the petitioner argued that the challenged 
provisions of the entity constitutions contravened an overarching 
constitutional principle, referenced in the Constitution’s Preamble, 
guaranteeing the collective equality of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as 
“constituent peoples.” The majority of the Court agreed with the core of 
this argument and invalidated several of the challenged provisions in both 
entity constitutions.  
The majority’s decision was bold for two reasons. First of all, it 
favored an abstract teleological theory of the Constitution, only vaguely 
supported by the language of the Preamble, against the more concrete 
historical claim (favored by the dissent) that the sub-state entities were 
deliberately designed as bases for the self-government of different 
constituent peoples (see Kulenovic´ 2016; Marko 2005: 10–11). Second, 
overruling important sections of the entity constitutions would inevitably 
generate disagreement and uncertainty about the amendments needed to 
implement the Court’s decision. As it happened, no agreement among the 
political parties on the requisite amendments was forthcoming and so a 
range of changes were ultimately imposed by the Office of the High 
Representative in 2002, expanding power-sharing to all levels of 
government and requiring that all three constituent peoples within both 
entities be accorded the same status and rights (Bieber 2006: 121–33).  
Case U-5/98 is a complicated and difficult read, particularly because 
it is divided into several “partial decisions.” Nevertheless, one blunt fact 
is apparent: the Court divided along clear ethno-national lines: a majority 
bloc of Bosniak judges and International judges lined up against a 
vociferous dissenting bloc of Serb and Croat judges to invalidate sections 
of both the FBiH and RS constitutions. Split decisions such as this are not 
likely to escape notice in a deeply divided society. Indeed, although it 
may have helped assuage fears that the Court would be captured by one 
community to the detriment of the others, the practice of including a set 
num-ber of judges from each constituent people also serves to draw 
attention to the ethno-national affiliation of the judges, inviting 
accusations of political bias in non-unanimous and politically sensitive 
cases. Such accusations extend beyond the national judges 
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(who are simply presumed to favor their putative communal inter-ests) to 
the international judges as well, who are thought to favor the interests of 
the “international community” (Feldman 2011: 219). Indeed, academic 
commentary, although less vitriolic in tone, concurs with the general 
impression that the Court is, or at least has been, prone to ethno-
nationally driven decision-making patterns (McCrudden and O’Leary 
2013: ch. 6).  
The most recent case to highlight this problem is the Court’s decision 
in Case U 3/13 (November 2015), where a majority, including the 
international judges, ruled that a law establishing the 9th of January as a 
public holiday in the RS entity was unconstitutional. The 9th of January is 
significant because it marks the day in 1992 when Bosnian Serbs 
proclaimed the “independence” of RS, in addition to being the day when 
Eastern Orthodox Serbs celebrate St. Stephen’s Day. For this reason, the 
majority in U 3/ 13 concluded that the law unconstitutionally 
discriminated against non-Serbs. Prior to the decision, the RS legislature 
had issued a pre-emptive declaration stating that it would not obey the 
Court if it invalidated the law on public holidays (see EU Delegation to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Flash Report, 10 April 2015). It is no great 
surprise then that Bosnian Serb politicians have since refused to 
implement the Court’s ruling and condemned the Bosniak judges for 
imposing their political preferences “with the help of foreign judges.”26 
Milorad Dodik, the President of the RS entity, went so far as to call the 
Court “nothing but a Muslim court against Serbs.”27 At the time of 
writing, the main Bosnian Serb parties are threatening to blockade central 
institutions unless a new law is passed to remove international judges 
from the Court and prevent the possibility of one community’s judges 
outvoting the other two communities’ judges in split decisions. Beyond 
this recent controversy, the Court has had compliance problems with 
many of its decisions (EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Flash 
Report, 23 April 2015; see also Banovic´, Muharemovic´, and Kapo 
2014). 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The Influence of Ethno-National Affiliation on Judicial Behavior 
 
The impression that the Constitutional Court divides along ethno-
national lines is consistent with what one might expect in a 
 
26 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/sds-proposing-changes-to-bosnian-consti-tutional-
court-12-08-2015-1.
 
 
27 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-defy-bosnian-constitution-al-court-
over-serb-national-day-ruling-11-27-2015.
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society such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the characteristic traits of 
deeply divided societies is the tendency for the salient cleavages to infuse 
almost every aspect of social and political life. Elections proceed “like a 
census,” with parties mobilizing on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Moore 
2001: 89). Residence, education, media, and economic opportunity 
structures also tend to be fragmented along the same lines. In short, as 
Donald Horowitz puts it, “[i]n divided societies, ethnic affiliations are 
powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive” (1985: 12). Bosnia-
Herzegovina certainly fits this pattern. Most of the major political parties 
draw on a virtually mono-ethnic electoral base, and the ostensibly non-
nationalist and multi-ethnic Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH (“SDP”) 
relies on an overwhelmingly Bosniak vote. Moreover, with the sole 
exception of the SDP, all of the major parties are overtly nationalist in 
their orientation and, for most of the post-war peri-od, relatively hard-line 
nationalist parties have held the reins of power at both central and entity 
levels. Even the once ostensibly “moderate” Serb nationalist party, Savez 
nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (“SNSD”), openly threaten secession and 
frequently contest the legitimacy of the central state institutions. In 
addition, as a result of massive population displacement during the war, 
the country is divided into mostly ethnically homogenous zones; mixed 
municipalities (such as Sarajevo, Mostar, or Brcˇko) are the exception 
(Bieber 2006: 29–33). Predictably, education is also mostly mono-ethnic; 
even in mixed areas, separate Croat and Bosniak schools teaching 
different curricula sometimes operate under the same roof (Swimelar 
2013).28 Likewise, media is ethnically differentiated, with Bosniaks 
oriented toward Sarajevo-based outlets, Croats looking to media from 
Croatia, and Serbs consuming media from RS or Serbia (Jusic and 
Ahmetasevic´ 2013). Finally, and partly as a result of geographic 
segregation, economic status is ethnically stratified, with Croats being 
generally more affluent than Bosniaks and Serbs (Bieber 2006: 33–39). 
 
Given the pervasive salience of ethno-national divisions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there are at least two theoretical reasons to expect ethno-
national affiliation to influence judicial behavior on the Court. First, this 
is what a broad reading of the “attitudinal model” of judicial behavior 
would predict. Proponents of the attitudinal model, pioneered to explain 
judicial decision-making on the U.S. Supreme Court, typically look at 
how individual judges’ votes tend to fall along a left-right ideological 
spectrum (Segal and Spaeth 2002). But there is no reason why the basic 
idea of 
 
28
 Recently, the FBiH Supreme Court ruled that this “two schools, one roof” practice was 
discriminatory (see Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH, Judgment 58 0 Ps 085653 13 Rev 
[29.08.2014]). 
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the attitudinal model—that judges are influenced by their political 
preferences—cannot be extended to other kinds of politics (see Ostberg 
and Wetstein 2007). If judges do decide many cases according to their 
political preferences, and those preferences are structured by ethno-
national affiliation, then we should expect judicial behavior to reflect 
differences in ethno-national affiliation. In the case of the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court, this expectation is buttressed by the fact that the 
appointment process is dominated by ethno-nationalist political parties 
who, in seeking to advance their political goals, can appoint judges’ 
whose ethno-national politics mirror their own.  
A second reason to expect ethno-national affiliation to influence 
judicial behavior is simple in-group favoritism. Social psychologists have 
found considerable evidence that people tend to favor members of their 
own group, even where the relevant group categories are not otherwise 
socially salient and even when those categories are only temporarily 
ascribed to subjects for the purposes of experimental research (Tajfel 
1974; Tajfel et al. 1971). Not surprisingly, group biases of this kind seem 
to be especially acute where the relevant group categories are politicized 
and/or out-group members are per-ceived to be a threat of some kind (see 
Cairns et al. 2006; Tajfel and Turner 1979) Apparently, judicial behavior 
is not immune to this phenomenon. A line of research from the United 
States has found evidence of ethnic biases in the criminal justice system 
there (see e.g. Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan 2012; Glaeser and 
Sacerdote 2003) and recent studies from Israel find evidence of ethnic 
bias in both bail hearings (Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010) and 
small claims awards (Shayo and Zussman 2010). It seems plausible then 
that judicial decision-making in a deeply divided society such as Bosnia-
Hercegovina would be prone to similar group biases.  
In light of the above considerations, we propose to test the following 
hypothesis against the judges’ voting records in non-unanimous abstract 
review cases: 
 
Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis: 
 
The domestic judges will be more likely (all else equal) to find a 
constitutional violation where the challenge is brought by a co-ethnic 
petitioner. 
 
It should be noted that evidence in support of this hypothesis would 
be consistent with either ethno-national attitudinal bias and/ or in-group 
favoritism. Unfortunately, as we explain later, our data and research 
design do not allow us to distinguish between the observable implications 
of these two putative causes. However, given the political and social 
salience of ethno-national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would 
expect some combination of both. 
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The Effects of Tenure 
 
Some commentators have speculated that the Court appears to be less 
ethno-nationally divided since the introduction of long-term tenure in 
2003, possibly signalling “an era in which loyalty to entities or peoples is 
subordinated to legal professionalism and loyalty to the Constitution and 
the Court” (Feldman 2005: 660; see also Choudhry and Stacey 2012). 
Indeed, although dissent rates have varied widely across both mandates, 
the overall rate of non-unanimous decisions during the long-term 
mandates is considerably lower; 17.2 percent of plenary decisions during 
the Court’s long-term mandate (up to the end of 2013) were accompanied 
by at least one dissent, whereas 25.3 percent of decisions during the first 
5-year mandate were non-unanimous. That being said, the Court’s 
caseload increased substantially after it assumed jurisdiction over human 
rights challenges from the now defunct Human Rights Chamber in 
2003.29 Thus, the higher rate of unanimous decisions in the latter period 
may simply reflect a greater degree of “dissent aversion”—these judges 
are busier and so they may be less inclined to bother with writing 
dissenting opinions (see Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013: ch. 6).  
Still, there are some general reasons to expect that long-term tenure 
might make a difference for patterns of judicial behavior. As was noted 
earlier, the conventional wisdom is that life or long-term tenure are 
critical safeguards against undue political influence and interference. The 
Federalist Papers, for example, describe life tenure as the most important 
guarantee of the “independent spirit in the judges which must be essential 
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty” (Hamilton 2009: 395). 
In a similar vein, contemporary governments and international 
organizations also cite long-term and life tenure as best practice. The 
International Bar Association’s “New Delhi Standards” for judicial 
independence (1982: para. 22) state that “[j]udicial appointments should 
generally be for life, subject to removal for cause and compulsory 
retirement at an age fixed by law at the date of appointment” and that 
“[the institution of temporary judges should be avoided as far as possible 
long except where there exists a historic democratic tradition”. Likewise, 
the U.S. Agency 
 
29
 The Human Rights Chamber was established under the terms of the Dayton Agreement as a 
parallel but temporary court for hearing human rights complaints in the after-math of the war. The 
Chamber consisted of six national judges (appointed in the same way as judges of the Constitutional 
Court and adhering to the convention of parity as between constituent peoples) and eight international 
judges appointed by the Council of Europe. The Chamber’s mandate expired in 2003, at which point a 
considerable backlog of pending cases was transferred to a temporary Human Rights Commission 
operating within the Constitutional Court. As we explain later, we do not consider these cases here 
because the ethnicity of the claimants cannot reliably be coded. 
14 
 
 
for International Development’s “Guidance for Promoting Judicial 
Independence and Impartiality” endorses life and long-term tenure as 
preferable to short-term appointments (2002). Many academic treatments 
of judicial independence concur with this conventional wisdom. La Porta 
et al., for example, treat long-term tenure as the core of judicial 
independence, reasoning that judges with life-tenure “are both less 
susceptible to direct political pressure and less likely to have been 
selected by the government currently in office” (2004: 453). In contrast, 
short-term renewable tenure is typically thought to be the worst 
arrangement for judicial independence because it creates obvious re-
appointment pressures that may influence judicial decision-making 
(Sadurski 2014: 27). Between these two poles are non-renewable terms. 
Judges with non-renewable terms do not face reappointment pressures, 
but they may nevertheless (depending on the length of their man-date) 
feel pressured to placate powerful elites for the sake of later career 
opportunities (Sadurski 2014: 28).30 
The empirical evidence on the effects of judicial tenure is by no 
means conclusive. Studies of state courts in the United States, where there 
is considerable variance in judicial tenure, suggest that judges who face 
reappointment pressures—in the form of political reappointment, 
contested elections, or uncontested retention elections—do behave 
differently. Brace and Hall (1997) find that otherwise liberal judges who 
face re-election or reappointment, and especially those with relatively 
short mandates, are significantly more likely to impose the death penalty 
(see also Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Kelly 2014). In a similar vein, Shep-
herd (2009) finds that judges on state supreme courts who face re-election 
or reappointment are more likely to decide cases in ways that favor the 
political preferences of their re-appointers. The cross-national 
comparative evidence, however, is less defini-tive (see Hayo and Voigt 
2007; Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; Herron and Randazzo 2003; 
Smithey and Ishiyama 2002). In a recent cross-national study, Melton and 
Ginsburg (2014) find that long-term tenure does enhance independent 
decision-making, but only in tandem with apolitical selection systems and 
only in authoritarian or transitional democracies. There is also at least 
some evidence to suggest that relatively short-term appointments do not 
necessarily inhibit judicial independence (see Chandrachud 
 
 
30
 Some might be tempted to view non-renewable tenure as functionally equivalent to life-
tenure—after all, judges under either arrangement have no need to worry about reap-pointment. We 
disagree. As Wojciech Sadurski explains, “judges who come to the end of their term. . . and yet are well 
before retirement age can be quite conscious of the fact that their future may be shaped by politicians, 
and this may contribute to their political depend-ence” (2014: 28). 
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2013). The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for example, is noted for 
taking assertive stands against government, despite the fact that the 
judges serve non-renewable terms of only 8 years (Landau 2010; Schor 
2009). In sum, our understanding of when and how judicial tenure matters 
across different courts and in different contexts is still in the relatively 
early stages of development.  
With respect to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
whether or not we should expect differences in tenure to actually 
moderate the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behavior 
surely depends, at least in part, on how we model the underlying cause of 
that influence. According to both the attitudinal and in-group favoritism 
models outlined above, tenure should make no significant difference 
because the influence of ethno-national affiliation is sincere and stems 
from a lack of impartiality (as opposed to independence). But a strategic 
model of judicial behavior might attribute a tendency to side with co-
ethnic petitioners to the influence of sanctions and rewards deployed by 
political elites (Epstein and Jacobi 2010): if judges with shorter mandates 
lack independence relative to long-term appointed judges, they will be 
relatively more prone to curry the favor of political elites in the hope of 
gaining post-appointment advantages; and if the relationship between 
judges and political elites follows the usual pattern of communal 
“pillarization” associated with deeply divided polities, we should expect 
this dynamic to play out primarily within each communal pillar (Luther 
1999).31 In other words, political elites will reward co-ethnic judges for 
friendly decisions and, consequently, shorter term judges will be 
relatively more inclined to favor the preferences of co-ethnic elites. In this 
model, tenure should make a significant difference because the influence 
of ethno-national affiliation is (at least in part) strategic and reflects a lack 
of independence (as opposed to impartiality). The plausibility of this 
conjecture in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina is strengthened by the 
fact that some judges from the Constitutional Court’s first mandate did 
actually go on to hold government or public sector jobs of some kind after 
their terms expired. Accordingly, we propose to test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
The Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis: 
 
Any propensity to favor co-ethnic petitioners will be more 
pronounced in the behavior of judges with 5-year terms than in those 
judges who enjoy long-term tenure. 
 
But there is another, less categorical, way to think about the effects of 
tenure. The simple attitudinal model we sketched above 
 
31 “Pillarization” here refers to the creation and maintenance of 
parallel networks and organizational structures that tightly correspond to 
the salient communal divisions. 
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presumes that the judges’ political preferences are effectively static and 
constantly revealed across time. In other words, an ethno-nationalist 
judge will remain an ethno-nationalist and consistently tend to decide 
cases in accordance with her ethno-nationalist preferences. These 
assumptions may not be valid. Several studies of judicial behavior in the 
United States have noted the phenomenon of “ideological drift”—some 
initially conservative or liberal judges appear to become more or less so 
over time (see e.g. Epstein et al. 2007). Other studies suggest general 
“acclimation effects,” finding that the ideological aspect of judicial 
decision-making is relatively less predictable early in a judge’s tenure but 
tends to settle into more a predictable disposition after the judge 
“acclimates” to her role on the court (Boyea 2010; Collins 2008; Kaheny, 
Haire, and Benesh 2008; Hagle 1993; Hettinger et al. 2003; Hurwitz and 
Stefko: 2004; Wood et al. 1998). Hurwitz and Stefko (2004), for example, 
find that attitudinal influences “progressively dominate” decision-making 
at the U.S. Supreme Court—the justices become increasingly likely over 
the course of their tenure to depart from precedent in ways that track 
political ideology, an effect that the authors attribute to the justices 
gradually adjusting to the power they wield on a relatively unconstrained 
apex court (128). As we explained above, the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court is also a relatively unconstrained apex court. It is plausible then that 
the Court’s judges experience a similar kind of acclimation whereby 
ethno-nationalism comes to play a greater role in their decision-making 
over time. Furthermore, the longer a judge serves on a court, the more 
opportunity she has to learn about the preferences and tendencies of other 
judges (Collins 2008). Thus, a judge who initially makes a determined 
effort to decide cases legalistically (and without regard to ethno-national 
affiliation) may become increasingly jaded as she observes other judges 
deciding cases along clear ethno-national lines. Consequently, she may 
become less hesitant to give rein to her own biases as her tenure goes on. 
In light of these conjectures, we propose to test the following hypothesis: 
 
The Acclimation Hypothesis: 
 
The propensity to favor co-ethnic petitioners will increase as a judge 
accumulates years of tenure on the Court. 
 
Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
Our analysis relies on an original dataset of all non-unanimous 
abstract review decisions of the Constitutional Court terminated on the 
merits from the beginning of the Court’s work in 1997 to the end of 2013. 
The unit of analysis is the individual judge’s ‘vote’ (N 5190). Our focus 
on non-unanimous decisions is based on a well-rehearsed rationale: a 
dissent is the clearest indication that the 
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law at issue in the dispute was sufficiently indeterminate as to pre-sent the 
judges with a genuine choice about which way to decide (Pritchett 1948; 
Tate and Sittiwong 1989).32 Our decision to focus on abstract review 
cases is motivated by two considerations. First, the Co-Ethnic Petitioner 
Hypothesis requires that we can reliably code for the ethnicity of the 
claimant in the cases we look at. Although one might be able to make an 
educated guess at the ethnicity of a claimant on the basis of his or her 
surname, many of the Court’s published decisions in appeals and referrals 
from lower courts use only the parties’ initials. And even where they are 
given in full, names are not necessarily reliable markers for ethno-
national affiliation; many surnames are ethnically ambiguous and mixed 
ethnic heritage further complicates coding (even for claimants with names 
that are recognizably Muslim). The advantage then of abstract review 
cases is that the petitioners are always politicians whose ethno-national 
affiliation is either widely known or discernible from publicly available 
data. The price we pay for focusing on abstract review decisions is that 
we cannot determine if or how far the effect of ethno-national affiliation 
extends to the rest of the Court’s work (where the issues at stake may 
well be less ethno-nationally charged and of relatively little constitutional 
consequence).  
With respect to the characteristics of the decisions, our data include 
the level of government under review, the type of legal issue or issues 
raised in each case,33 as well as the ethno-national affiliation and political 
party of the petitioner(s). With respect to the judges, the data include the 
ethno-national affiliation of each judge, the number of years already 
served in their tenure, the number of years remaining in the judges’ 
mandates at the time of the decision, and the political party (or parties) 
controlling the relevant entity legislature at the time of the judges’ 
appointment.34 We use dichotomous variables to code the individual 
decision of each 
 
 
 
32 This is not to say that the outcome in unanimous decisions is a foregone conclusion. But, 
given the methods we use here, including unanimous decisions would limit the vari-ance that can be 
leveraged to explain individual judicial choice (Tate and Sittiwong 1989: 902; for an example of how 
data on unanimous decisions can be used to study judicial behavior, see Epstein et al. 2013).
 
 
33 If a case relates to more than one distinct piece of legislation or government action, we 
include each as a separate set of observations, provided that the judges are nonunani-mous with respect 
to each set. In other words, only the non-unanimous components of such cases are included in the 
dataset.
 
 
34 Based on what we know about how appointment in the entity legislatures works, we code 
Bosniak judges has having been appointed by the dominant Bosniak party in the FBiH legislature at the 
time of appointment (which in all cases is the SDA) and Croat judges as having been appointed by 
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (“HDZ”), which has always been the dominant 
Croat party in the FBiH. We code Serb judges as hav-ing been appointed by whichever Serb party 
controlled the RS legislature at the time of appointment.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Abstract Review Decisions 
 
Variable Mean (N 5190) 
  
Judge votes to find a violation 0.342 
Court finds a violation 0.411 
Ethno-national affiliation of petitioner  
- Bosniak petitioner 0.584 
- Serb petitioner 0.279 
- Croat petitioner 0.137 
Case challenges FBiH 0.184 
Case challenges RS 0.489 
Case challenges BiH 0.326 
Bosniak judge 0.226 
Serb judge 0.2 
Croat judge 0.232 
International judge 0.342 
Case raises an ECHR issue 0.311 
5-Year mandate 0.5 
  
 
judge (coded “1” if they are in the majority finding a constitutional 
violation or, where the majority does not find a violation, if they author a 
dissent to that effect). Summary statistics for all observations are 
displayed in Table 1.  
A preliminary analysis of this data does indeed reveal pat-terns which 
suggest that ethno-national affiliation influences the Court’s decision-
making in abstract review cases. Table 2 reports the fraction of judges’ 
votes finding a constitutional violation by unit of government under 
review. For ease of comparison, these percentages are graphed in Figure 
1.  
As can be seen, international judges and Bosniak judges almost never 
vote against a law or government action from BiH while Serb judges do 
so in nearly 87 percent of observations. In contrast, in cases involving RS, 
Serb judges virtually never vote to find a violation (1/17) while Bosniak 
judges do so in about 71 percent of observations. With respect to cases 
involving FBiH, international judges find a violation in over 50 percent of 
observations, while Serb and Croat judges find violations in only about 
12 percent of observations. These patterns are, broadly speaking, 
consistent with the constitutional preferences espoused by the main 
ethno-nationalist parties, as well as the findings of public opinion 
research on the constitutional preferences of each ethno-national group; 
Bosniaks tend to be centralists, while Croats and 
 
 
Table 2. Fraction of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review 
Decisions 
 
 BiH RS FBiH 
    
Bosniak judge 2/14 (0.143) 15/21 (0.714) 3/8 (0.375) 
Serb judge 11/13 (0.846) 1/17 (0.059) 1/8 (0.125) 
Croat judge 5/14 (0.357) 7/22 (0.318) 1/8 (0.125) 
International judge 1/21 (0.048) 12/33 (0.364) 6/11 (0.545) 
Total 19/62 (0.306) 35/93 (0.376) 11/35 (0.314) 
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Figure 1. Percentage of Judges’ Votes Finding a Constitutional Violation by 
Unit of Government. 
 
Serbs tend to be decentralists (Prism Research 2013: 44). In other words, 
the observed patterns of judicial behavior appear to reflect ethno-national 
perspectives. More to the point for our purposes here, the data are 
consistent with the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis. As can be seen from 
Table 3 and Figure 2, in observations from abstract review cases in which 
the judge and petitioner(s) are not co-ethnics, only about 23 percent of 
votes (34 out 147) find a constitutional violation. In contrast, where the 
judge and (at least one) petitioner are co-ethnics, 72 percent of votes 
(31/43) find a constitutional violation. Furthermore, and consistent with 
the Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis, the tendency to find a constitutional 
violation where the judge and (at least one) petitioner are co-ethnics is 
slightly higher (roughly 77 per-cent, or 17/22) for observations from the 
5-year mandate than it is for observations from the long-term mandate 
(about 67 per-cent, or 14/21). 
 
The above-noted patterns have important consequences for the 
aggregate outcomes of the Court’s decisions. Taking into account both 
unanimous and non-unanimous decisions, abstract review challenges to 
the RS and FBiH entities have a successes rate of 47.6 and 50 percent, 
respectively. In contrast, challenges to the BiH level only succeed in 26.3 
percent of cases. Bosniak petitioners are also the most successful 
challengers, bringing 29 of 67 (or 43.5 percent) of the abstract review 
challenges and winning in 15 (or 51.7 percent) of these. In contrast, Serb 
petitioners brought 31 of these challenges, of which they won only 6 (or 
 
Table 3. Fraction of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review 
Decisions 
 
 All Observations Short-Term Mandate Long-Term Mandate 
    
Non co-ethnic petitioner 34/147 (0.23) 18/73 (0.25) 16/74 (0.22) 
Co-ethnic petitioner 31/43 (0.72) 17/22 (0.77) 14/21 (0.67) 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Judges’ Votes Finding a Constitutional Violation by 
Mandate. 
 
19.4 percent), while Croats brought only 7 challenges, winning in only 3 
(or 42.9 percent) of them. In short, the Court’s output would seem to 
favor Bosniak constitutional preferences, upholding central state laws in 
the vast majority of cases but regularly disciplining the entities.  
As suggestive as this preliminary analysis might be, it only provides 
cursory evidence of the effects of ethno-nationalism and judicial tenure 
on judicial behavior. In what follows, we test our hypotheses against the 
data in a more rigorous and nuanced way. 
 
Testing the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis 
 
To test the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis, we estimate logit 
regression models with standard errors clustered by judge.35 The 
dependent variable is the judge’s “vote,” coded “1” to find a 
constitutional violation and “0” if otherwise. The main independent 
variable of interest is a dummy variable, coded “1” if at least one of the 
abstract review petitioners and the judge are co-ethnics.36  
Our models include several controls for potential confounding 
variables. Arguably the most important of these is a variable to control for 
alignment between the judges’ appointing political party and the 
petitioners’ political party. The Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis is 
motivated by the theory that the judges will favor co-ethnic elites because 
they share the same ethno-nationalist pol-icy preferences and/or because 
of in-group favoritism. But ethno-nationalist politics and ethnicity are 
likely to be highly correlated 
 
35 In so far as the same judges feature in the dataset across numerous observations, “naive” 
standard errors may under-or over-estimate the significance of certain judge-specific effects (for 
sophisticated discussion of the pros and cons of using clustered standard errors, see Zorn 2006).
 
 
36 Some abstract review cases are brought by a group of petitioners representing more than one 
ethno-national community. For example, a petition may be brought by a group of Serbs and Croat 
politicians, in which case the co-ethnic petitioner variable will take the value of “1” for both the Serb 
and Croat judges deciding that case.
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with party political affiliation in a divided society. Thus, a tendency to 
favor co-ethnic challengers may be partly (or even entirely) a function of 
political partisanship. Indeed, party-political loyalty has been found to be 
a strong predictor of judicial behavior on other apex courts (see e.g. 
Garoupa, Gomez-Pomar, and Grembi 2013; Honnige 2009). Thus, we 
include a dummy variable to control for the possibility that the domestic 
judges may be more likely, other things being equal, to support 
challenges brought by the political party that appointed them. Including 
this variable comes at some cost—we are forced to drop nine 
observations (i.e., one case) in which the party of the petitioners could not 
be confidently determined. It should also be noted that in all challenges 
brought by Croats, the petitioners belonged to the same party as the party 
that appointed the Croat judges (i.e., HDZ). Accordingly, we cannot 
confidently distinguish between the effects of party-political loyalty and 
ethno-national affiliation with respect to Croat judges. Naturally, we also 
include categorical variables to control for the ethno-national affiliation 
of the judge (using the international judges as the reference category) and 
the petitioner (using Croat judges as the reference category). The 
rationale here is that, all else equal, some groups may be more prone to 
bringing relatively more spurious constitutional challenges and some 
groups of judges may be relatively more restrained (or “activist”) than 
others. Indeed, these control variables are essential; the main independent 
variable of interest – ethnic alignment between the judge and petitioner—
is effectively a product of them. 
In addition to the above, we include several supplementary control 
variables. We use a categorical variable to control for the unit of 
government whose law or action is being challenged (using the BiH state 
level as the reference category); it is possible that some units of 
government, particularly RS, may be more constitutionally “rebellious” 
than others. In addition, we use a dummy variable to control for the 
influence of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina incorporates the ECHR, making it 
directly enforceable and superior to all ordinary domestic law37; it is 
conceivable that, all else equal, judges may be more likely to find a 
constitutional violation in cases where they can appeal to the external 
authority of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Finally, we use a dummy variable to control for whether 
or not the case was decided during the initial 5-year short-term mandate. 
The rationale here is that 
 
37
  Art.II.II. 
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the political context during those first 5 years may have been more or less 
prone to meritorious challenges or relatively more or less “activist” 
judgments (although we have no theoretical expectation either way).  
The first of our models tests the general effect of a co-ethnic 
petitioner on the probability of a judge finding a constitutional violation. 
Model 2 uses interaction terms to test if the effect is significant for both 
Bosniak and Serb judges taken separately (for the reasons noted above, 
we do not do the same for Croat judges). Model 3 replaces the party-
political alignment variable with a control variable that roughly tracks 
ideological proximity between the petitioner’s party and the judge’s 
appointing party (coded “1” if both are generally right of center or both 
are generally left of center). Admittedly, this is a rather blunt proxy for 
ideological affinity. But if we assume that the political parties appoint 
judges who are ideologically proximate to them, Model 3 should give us 
some sense of the relative strength of more traditional (i.e., non-
nationalist) left-right attitudinal influences (we restrict observations to 
just the domestic judges in Model 3 because we do not presently have any 
way to code the probable ideological leanings of the international judges).  
As can be seen in Table 4, the results provide robust support for the 
Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis. Model 1 shows that an alignment of 
ethnicity between the petitioner and the judge significantly increases the 
likelihood of finding a violation, even when controlling for the influence 
of party-political appointment. The difference in predicted probabilities 
for finding a constitutional violation in these cases is also a substantively 
meaningful one. All else being equal, the probability of a judge finding a 
constitutional violation in abstract review cases is only. 20 [.15, .26], but 
it rises to .84 [.74, .94] when the judge and petitioner are co-ethnics. 
Robustness tests on subsets of the data show that this effect is significant 
(and comparable) for all three groups of domestic judges: the average 
marginal effect (AME) of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of 
finding a constitutional violation is .63 [.49, .78] for Bosniak judges; .64 
[.49, .78] for Serb judges, and .67 [.52, .82] for Croat judges.38 Model 2 
provides additional confirmation that the effect in question is significant 
for both Bosniak and Serb judges (the interaction terms with the ethnicity 
of the challenger are both positive and statistically significant) and Model 
3 shows that the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner remains significant when 
controlling for left-right ideological proximity between the petitioner and 
the judge (indeed, putative left-right 
 
38  We use Stata’s “subpop” command to calculate these AMEs. 
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Table 4. Logit Regressions for Finding a Constitutional Violation in Non-
Unanimous Decisions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Petitioner is co-ethnic of judge 3.786** – 4.1* 
 (0.856)  1.771 
Petitioner is from judge’s appointing political 21.074 0.41 – 
party (0.733) (0.684)  
Petitioner and judge’s appointing party are – – 0.0737 
ideologically proximate   (0.585) 
Bosniak judge 21.187 20.948 21.99 
 (0.791) (0.674) (1.74) 
Bosniak petitioner 0.716 0.191 0.0232 
 (1.447) (1.619) (2.12) 
Bosniak judge*Bosniak petitioner – 2.211* – 
  (0.942)  
Serb judge 20.737 21.017** – 
 (0.384) (0.381)  
Serb petitioner 22.08** 23.3** 23.363 
 (0.684) (1.178) (2.02) 
Serb judge*Serb petitioner – 4.691** – 
 
20.387 
(1.786)  
Croat judge – – 
 (0.521)   
Challenge to FBiH Law or Gov’t Action 20.776 20.696 22.52 
 1.356 (1.62) (1.64) 
Challenge to RS Law or Gov’t Actio 21.305 21.218 22.4 
 1.396 (1.68) (1.828) 
The case raises an ECHR Issue 20.146 20.262 0.022 
 0.507 (0.506) (0.763) 
Case is from short-term mandate 0.182 0.107 20.213 
 (0.372) (0.374) (0.44) 
Constant 0.544 0.285 1.287 
 1.432 (0.739) 1.915 
Log pseudolikelihood 5 292.480 293.038 254.571 
Pseudo R2 5 0.209 0.205 0.336 
Wald chi2(9) 5 91.80 137.31 74.89 
Prob > chi
2
 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of obs 5 181 181 125 
     
Comment: Robust standard errors (clustered by judge) in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
 
ideological proximity seems to make virtually no difference). Across all 
three models, the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner is robust to alternate 
specifications that drop the supplementary control variables (i.e., unit of 
government being challenged, the mandate, and the presence of an ECHR 
issue). 
 
Testing the Tenure Hypotheses 
 
To test the tenure hypotheses, we ran variations of Model 1, but with 
interaction terms relating to the judge’s tenure on the court.39 In Model 4, 
we test for a simple interaction between short-term tenure and the effects 
of a co-ethnic petitioner; if the Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis is correct, 
the effect of a co-ethnic 
 
39
 Our methodology for interaction effects in the following analysis closely follows the advice of 
Brambor et al. (2006). 
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petitioner should be enhanced by short-term mandates.40 This approach 
does not account for the fact that the long-term tenured judges were 
appointed at various ages and so the length of their mandates, i.e., the 
number of years between their appointment and mandatory retirement at 
age 70, also varies. It is plausible that there may be little practical 
difference between the behavior of a judge appointed for a 5-year term at 
the age of 55 and a judge appointed at the age of 65 with mandatory at 
age 70. Accordingly, in Model 5, we use an interaction term for (the 
natural log of) the length of the judge’s tenure, i.e., the number of years 
from the time of her appointment to the expiry of her mandate. The idea 
here is to determine if, regardless of the for-mal tenure category, the 
effect of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behavior is amplified by 
relatively shorter terms. Finally, Model 6 tests the Acclimation 
Hypothesis by including an interaction term for the (natural log) of the 
number of years of tenure accumulated at the time of the judge’s decision. 
If the Acclimation Hypothesis is correct, the effect of ethno-national 
affiliation should be amplified as years of accumulated tenure increase. 
The results for these models are reported in Table 5.  
As the results for Model 4 illustrate, contrary to the predictions of the 
Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis, short-term tenure per se does not seem to 
significantly amplify the tendency to side with a co-ethnic petitioner (see 
Table 5). The coefficient for the relevant interaction term is not 
significant. And although the predicted probability of a judge finding a 
constitutional violation in cases of a co-ethnic petitioner is somewhat 
higher for short-term tenured judges (.83 [.65, 1.0]) than it is for long-
term appointed judges (.75 [.54, .96]), the AME of a co-ethnic petitioner 
on the probability of finding a constitutional violation does not differ 
significantly as between long-term and short-term tenured judges. For the 
former, the AME of a co-ethnic petitioner is .55 [.31, .80], while for the 
latter it is .58 [.34, .82]. The estimated “contrast” between these two 
marginal effects is only 0.03 [2.20, .27], a difference which is clearly not 
significant.41 
 
 
 
40
 Because two of the short-term domestic judges in our dataset, Judge Marko Arsovic ,´ (a Serb) 
and Judge Mirko Zovko (a Croat), were already over the age of 60 at the time of appointment they 
might, arguably, be less affected by post-appointment pressures and incentives. Accordingly, we ran an 
alternate specification of Model 4 in which we exclude observations of these judges.  
41
 These results are robust to the alternate specification of Model 4 that excludes those short-term 
appointed judges who were appointed over the age of 60. In fact, with this specification the marginal 
effects of a co-ethnic petitioner for both long-term tenured and short-term tenured judges are virtually 
identical; the AME is .55 [.31, .79] for the former and .55 [.29, .81] for the latter. 
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Table 5. Logit Regressions for Interaction Effects of Ethno-National Affiliation 
with Tenure 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
Petitioner is co-ethnic of judge 2.635* 2.44 1.465 
 (0.791) (1.363) (1.22) 
Judge has short-term mandate 0.278 – – 
 (0.416) 
20.147 
 
Length of judge’s mandate – – 
  (0.28) 
20.457 Accumulated tenure at time of decision – – 
   (0.420) 
Co-ethnic petitioner*short-term mandate 0.211 – – 
 (0.738)   
Co-ethnic petitioner*length of judge’s mandate – 0.079 – 
  (0.508)  
Co-ethnic petitioner*accumulated tenure – – 0.829 
   (0.715) 
Petitioner is from judge’s appointing political party 20.228 20.076 20.126 
 (0.775) 0.784 (0.828) 
Bosniak judge 20.907 20.909 20.956 
 (0.655) (0.637) (0.607) 
Serb judge 20.851* 20.873* 20.999 
 (0.416) (0.443) (0.523) 
Croat judge 20.376 20.364 20.375 
 (0.450) (0.437) (0.447) 
Challenge to FBiH Law or Gov’t Action 20.027 20.025 20.085 
 (0.719) (0.716) (0.708) 
Challenge to RS Law or Gov’t Action 0.190 0.173 0.138 
 (0.474) 0. (48) (0.49) 
The case raises an ECHR Issue 20.458 20.483 20.493 
 (0.415) (0.415) (0.423) 
Constant 20.918 20.443 0.008 
 (0.464) (0.743) (0.813) 
Log pseudolikelihood 5 299.159 299.472 298.842 
Pseudo R2 5 0.152 0.15 0.155 
Wald chi2(9) 5 85.95 68.12 53.67 
Prob > chi
2
 5 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Number of obs 5 181 181 181 
    
 
Comment: Robust standard errors (clustered by judge) in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p 
<0.01 
 
The results of Model 5, where we substitute the formal ten-ure 
category for number of years in the judge’s term, also fail to support the 
Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis. In this case, that the coefficient of the 
interaction term here is insignificant is not, all on its own, hard evidence 
against the hypothesis. The coefficient of an interaction term XZ only 
reflects the effect of X on Y when both X and Z are greater than zero. 
Thus, where Z is a continuous variable, “it is perfectly possible for the 
marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively relevant 
values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the 
interaction term is insignificant” (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006: 74; 
see also Berry et al. 2010). To determine if there is a significant inter-
action between X and Z, one needs to look beyond the coefficients and 
calculate the marginal effects of X for meaningful values of Z (Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder 2006). In light of these considerations, we estimate and 
plot the AME of a co-ethnic 
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects (with 95% CIs) of a Co-Ethnic Petitioner 
by Length of Judge’s Mandate 
 
petitioner across the spectrum of observed values for term length. As 
Figure 3 shows, the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of 
finding a constitutional violation is significant and virtually static across 
this entire range and so it seems then that the length of a judge’s tenure 
does not enhance (or diminish) the effect.  
Turning now to Model 6, where we test the Acclimation Hypothesis, 
we do find some affirmative evidence. Again the interaction term is 
insignificant. However, because the conditioning variable here is 
continuous, we follow the same procedure as above and calculate and the 
AMEs of a co-ethnic petitioner across 
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Figure 4. Average Marginal Effects (with 95% CIs) of a Co-Ethnic Petitioner 
by Accumulated Years of Tenure 
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the range of observed values for accumulated tenure at the time of the 
judges’ decisions. This time the plot does suggest a positive interaction 
(see Figure 4). The effect of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of 
finding a constitutional violation is significant at all but the lowest two 
values in this range and, as the Acclimation Hypothesis predicts, this 
effect increases with years of accumulated tenure. In other words, the 
effect of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behavior appears to be 
enhanced by time served on the court. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Before discussing the importance of these findings, a few caveats are 
warranted. First of all, as we noted earlier, our data relates only to abstract 
review cases and so we cannot generalize here about the influence of 
ethno-national affiliation across the Court’s entire caseload. Abstract 
review challenges make up about 20 percent of the cases decided in the 
period we consider and these cases are inherently political and ethno-
nationally charged (they are initiated by politicians mobilized along 
ethno-national lines). Thus, a finding of ethno-national bias in abstract 
review cases does not necessarily tell us anything about the judges’ 
behavior in appeals or referrals from lower courts. It is certainly plausible 
that these other aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction, in so far as they may 
be more concerned with individual claims of right than ethno-national 
politics, are relatively unaffected by the influence of ethno-national 
affiliation. Indeed, had we been able to reliably code the ethnicity of 
claimants in these other cases, we might have been able to determine 
whether the observed influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial 
behavior is driven by ethno-nationalist political preferences or simple 
inter-group biases – a finding that ethno-national affiliation is not a 
significant predictor of judicial behavior in these other cases, where big 
constitutional controversies are not the norm, would suggest that the 
influence we observe in the abstract review cases is truly attitudinal and 
not merely a consequence of in-group favoritism. Future research (we 
hope) may yet find a way to surmount the coding challenge we faced. 
Second, despite their political nature, most of the Court’s abstract review 
decisions decided during the period we consider are unanimous (roughly 
66 percent). This much suggests that, in the bulk of the Court’s work, 
other factors (e.g. legal reasoning, dissent aversion) are more influential 
than ethno-national affiliation with respect to how the judges vote. 
Finally, our dataset—though inclusive of all non-unanimous abstract 
review decisions from 1997 to the end of 2013—is ultimately only 
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a sample from a particular slice of history. What is true of these judges’ 
during this period of time may not be true of the same or future judges in 
the future.  
These caveats aside, the evidence considered here strongly suggests 
that ethno-national affiliation exerts a significant influence on the Court 
in non-unanimous abstract review decisions. When the judges do 
disagree, ethno-national affiliation is a powerful predictor of how they 
divide and this influence cannot be reduced to simple party-political 
loyalty. Moreover, the influence of ethno-national affiliation appears to 
be unaffected by the length of the judges’ mandates; long-term appointed 
judges do not categorically differ from their short-term counterparts in 
their propensity to decide cases along ethno-national lines. In fact, 
consistent with an “acclimation effect,” ethno-national biases appear to be 
amplified by the experience of sitting on an apex court in a deeply 
divided society.  
These findings cut against a strategic explanation. As we noted 
earlier, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s fragmented and decentralized system 
insulates the Court from direct court curbing. Thus, the apparent influence 
of ethno-national affiliation is probably not a function of a strategic 
response to direct threats against the Court as an institution. To be sure, 
we cannot completely dismiss the explanation that the judges are 
strategically motivated by person-al incentives or pressures to side with 
co-ethnics. However, the fact that the short-term appointed judges are no 
less prone to side with co-ethnic petitioners, even though they would have 
relatively greater careerist incentives to do so, strongly suggests that the 
observed patterns really do reflect sincere political preferences and/or 
inter-group biases. In other words, the problem appears to be a lack of 
impartiality (as opposed to independence). 
Our findings also have some important implications for the study of 
courts more generally. Our analysis demonstrates that the attitudinal 
model can be modified and extended to study the influence of group-
based identity politics on judicial behavior. In many societies, this kind of 
politics is more salient than left-right ideological cleavages. Although we 
have not controlled for the full range of rival hypotheses that are relevant 
to the attitudinal model, our findings provide some preliminary support 
for the claim that ethno-nationalist attitudinal influences are distinct 
from—and perhaps more powerful than—left-right attitudinal influences. 
We hope that further studies will incorporate a similar approach in 
advancing the study of judicial behavior in non-U.S. contexts. Our 
findings also suggest that the phenomenon of acclimation effects, 
previously observed in the United States, may be broadly generalizable to 
other contexts.  
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Some might argue that the influence of ethno-national affiliation on 
judicial behavior is really not such a grave problem. After all, the U.S. 
Supreme Court enjoys a comparatively high degree of diffuse public 
support, despite the fact that its decision-making is popularly perceived to 
be influenced by the justices’ personal ideology and values (Gibson and 
Caldeira 2011). However, as Gibson and Caldeira observe, this popular 
perception of the U.S. Supreme Court coexists with the view that the 
justices are nevertheless “principled” decision-makers and not mere 
“politicians in robes” (2011: 214). Although there is yet to be any 
comparable empirical research on the legitimacy of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the decision-making patterns we have 
observed here are arguably less compatible with diffuse public support, at 
least in a deeply divided and post-conflict society. The Court exists in a 
context very unlike the American one; there is no long-standing tradition 
of the rule of law and the legitimacy of the Constitution is itself widely 
contested along ethno-national lines. The negotiators of the Bosnian 
Constitution may well have anticipated (and even hoped) that the 
domestic judges would tend to represent their respective ethno-national 
blocs; the inclusion of international judges as a putative balancing force 
on the Court would seem to suggest as much. However, once it becomes 
apparent that one community’s constitutional preferences tend to benefit 
from this arrangement, the notion that the international judges are some-
how neutral is probably not much consolation to those on the losing side. 
It is perhaps not surprising then that the Court has had the significant 
compliance problems we have noted here. Such problems are not 
necessarily caused by a legitimacy deficit, but the perceived ethno-
national partiality of the judges provides easy ammunition for those who 
would seek to shirk compliance with particular decisions or undermine 
the Court’s authority more generally. 
The question then is what, if anything, can be done to ameliorate this 
kind of problem. It is tempting, perhaps, to conclude that judicial 
impartiality in a deeply divided society is an impossible ideal. In such 
contexts, regardless of the appointment mechanism, judges are likely to 
be ethnically or ethno-nationally impartial for the simple reason that most 
people are ethnically or ethno-nationally impartial. Indeed, even an 
ostensibly apolitical appointment system can be captured by ethnic or 
ethno-national politics but there are some institutional reforms that might 
at least mitigate these hazards. Strict selection criteria for judicial
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office might limit the ability of political elites to pack a court with 
reliable allies. This does not guarantee that ethno-nationalist judges will 
not be appointed regardless, but it might help more impartial judges to 
win the selection contest more often. Reforms to legal education or 
judicial training might also be directed toward more integrated 
professional socialization in the hope that this would soften ethnocentric 
perspectives. Furthermore, as our findings here suggest, relatively shorter 
judicial mandates may actually be preferable to long-term tenure; if the 
influence of ethno-nationalism tends to grow with time, it may be better 
not to leave judges on the court for longer than is needed to secure their 
independence from the influence of post-appointment career pressures. 
Thus, in the case of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, appointments to the 
Court might be restricted to those who are already in their sixties, while 
still requiring retirement at age seventy. In this way, the problem of 
acclimation effects (if they do indeed exist) and the potential influence of 
post-tenure careerist pressures (if any) could both be addressed; judges 
would serve shorter-terms before retiring at an age after which they 
would have minimal post-appointment career prospects. Finally, the 
publication of dissents could be prohibited, as it is in several European 
constitutional courts (Kelemen 2013). Although this prohibition would 
inhibit the ability of people like us to study the judges’ behavior, a single 
institutional voice, uncomplicated by conspicuous ethno-national discord, 
might enhance a court’s authority. These are just a few speculative 
proposals. Further research on the effects of judicial selection and tenure 
in other divided societies is needed to determine if these or other 
prescriptions are prudent and generalizable. 
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